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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF IOWA.
2
SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND.2
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.'
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.4
ACTION.
Plaintiff's Nreyligence or Unskildness- When a defence pro tanto
onit-Evidence.-A person employed to keep the account books of an-
other may recover the balance due for his services upon other proof
zhereof, although the books were so negligently and unskilfully kept
as not to show the state of the accounts between the parties : .MeCor.
mirk v. Ketchum, 48 or 49 Wis.
The fact that plaintiff was negligent and unskilful in his employment
will not prevent his recovering what his services were really worth : ITd.
After evidence introduced by defendant to show plaintiff's negligence
and want of skill in his employment, it was competent for plaintiff, in
rebuttal, to introduce testimony that he was competent or qualified for
the employment, or that he was skilful, faithful and serviceable there-
in: Id.
AGENT. See Insurance.
ALIENS.
Construction of Treaty-Right to Inherit- Conflict between Treaty
and State Law-Statute of Limitations.-A citizen of Switzerland died
owning land in Virginia. His heirs were also citizens of Switzerland,
and being aliens could not, under the laws of Virginia, inherit the pro-
perty. By a treaty between the United States and Switzerland it was
provided that in such a case there should be accorded to the heirs such
terms as the laws of the state would permit, to sell such property. No
such terms had been fixed by the laws of the state. Upon a suit by the
heirs: Held, that the treaty gave them the right to sell, and no limit
being fixed by the state, this right might be exercised at any time:
.lauenstein v. Lynham, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
A treaty made by the United States is as much a part of the law of
every state as its own local laws and constitution, and in case of a con-
flict the treaty must prevail : Id.
IPrepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1879. The cases will probably be reported in 10 or 11 Otto.
2 From J. S. Runnels, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 51 Iowa Reports.
s From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 50 Md. Reports.
4 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 69 Mo. Reports.
6 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 35 Ohio St. Reports.
I From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 48 or 49 Wis. Reports.
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AMENDMENT. See Former Adjudication.
ASSUmPSIT.
Duty imposed by Statute.-Wherever a duty is imposed by Act of
Assembly, and no other mode of enforcing it is prescribed, the action
of assumpsit will lie, on the principle that where the law gives a claim
to one against another, it raises an implied assumpsit on the legal obli-
gation to pay: Appeal Tax (ourt of Baltimore v. Patterson, 50 1id.
BAILMENT.
Storage of Grain- Warehouseman-Liability of.-Where grain was
delivered to a warehouseman and stored by him in a separate bin, and
a receipt returned to the owner which stated that the grain was "bought
at owner's risk as to fire," no price being stipulated in the receipt, and
it appeared to be the local custom that grain was received in this man-
ner by warehousemen, and afterward purchased or returned, and it fur-
ther appeared that the warehouseman in this instance offered to nur-
chase the wheat while it was in store, but the owner refused to sell
Reld, that the warehouseman was not liable for the subsequent destruc-
tion of the grain by fire: Irons v. Kentner, 51 Iowa.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Alteration-Innocent Bolder.-A negotiable note for $10 was ex-
ecuted and delivered with a blank preceding the amount, and another
blank to be filled with the name of place of payment. Afterward the
words and figures were so changed as to make the amount one hundred
and ten dollars, and a place of payment was inserted. There was noth-
ing in the appearance of the note to excite suspicion, and it was taken
by plaintiff after alteration, before maturity, for a valuable consideration
and without notice of the alteration: Held, that no recovery could be
had thereon: Knoxville Bank v. Clark, 51 Iowa.
Endorsement for Gollection-A promissory note endorsed for collec-
tion cannot be transferred by one receiving such endorsement to another
who has notice of the limitation upon the authority of the holder:
Claflin v. Wilson et al., 51 Iowa.
A note having been endorsed for collection, and the endorsee having
sold the note, the retention of the money by the payee, in ignorance of
the fact that the note was sold, would not constitute a ratification of the
sale: Id.
Oral Evidence of Waiver of Demand and Notice by Endorser.-Oral
testimony is admissible to prove that the endorser, as between himself
,and the endorsee, at the time of endorsing a note in blank, waived de-
nand and notice: Dye v. Scott, 35 Ohio St.
A waiver of demand of payment at the maturity of a note is also a
waiver of notice of non-payment: Id.
BOND. See Surety.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Taxation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Criminal Law; Navigable Waters;
Taxation.
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CONTRACT. See Damages; Equity.
Mutual Propositions not accepted - Meeting of Minds - Letters
Partnership-Admission of New Partners-Effect of on Cbntract.-A
commission firm at C. employed an agent at Q. to obtain consignments
and make advances, and arranged with a bank at Q. to cash his drafts.
Afterwards they wrote to the bank that they would pay drafts only on
actual consignments, to which the cashier replied that thereafter they
would require a shipping bill. Afterwards and after two new partners,
without the knowledge of the bank, had been added to the firm, the
bank, without requiring shipping bills, cashed drafts, which the firm
paid. No consignments had been made to meet these drafts. In a
suit by the firm against the bank: Reld, that there was no binding
contract on the part of the bank to require shipping bills: Held, further,
that if there had been such contract it would have been determined by
the addition of the new partners without the knowledge or consent of
the bank: First Nat. Bank v. Rail, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
CONTRACTOR.
Payment in Instalments-Default of Payor-Rights of Contractor.-
Where work is done under a contract which provides for payment by
instalments at stated periods, and the payments are not made, the con-
tractor may quit the work and he will then be entitled to recover for all
that he has done at the contract rates; and this notwithstanding the
contract provides in express terms that the work shall be steadily prose-
cuted without intermission to final completion: Bean v. Miller, 69 Mo.
Where it is stipulated in a contract that the work to be done under
it is to be paid for upon the estimates of an engineer, to be made at
stated times, if the engineer makes only approximate estimates, and the
contractor is prevented from completing the work through the fault of
the other party, he may recover for the whole amount of work done, as
well that of which no estimate has been made as that which has been
estimated : Id.
CORPORATION.
Estoppel- Ultra Vires.-It being alleged by a corporation that the.
board of directors, by which a resolution was adopted authorizing a loan
and the execution of a deed to secure the same, was not a legally con-
stituted board: Rdd, that the deed and the bonds having been ex-
ecuted with all the legal formalities required by the charter of the com-
pany and its amendments, and the bonds negotiated in open market,
and their proceeds paid to the company, and appropriations made by it
to pay the interest, the company cannot be allowed to disavow and re-
pudiate its own acts to the injury of bona fide bondholders without
notice : Harrison v. Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad Co, 50 Md.
Whatever claims a corporation might have for interference by injunc-
tion to protect its rights against an abuse or exercise of corporate
powers ultra vires, the corporation as such, when a party to a cause, is
bound by the same rules of equity as an individual. The doctrine of
estoppel applies to the one as well as to the other : Id.
COURTS.
Identity of Persons-Presumption in Favor of Court of General Ju-
risdiction.-The records of the Circuit Court showed that on the 8th
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day of October 1875, Roach Millsaps was arrested on a charge of steal-
ing certain property described in the warrant; that on the 20th day of
October 1875, Pharris Millsaps, Jr., as principal, with others as sure-
ties, entered into a recognisance for the appearance of said Pharris Mill-
saps, Jr., at the next January term of the Circuit Court to answer to
the charge of larceny; that at the January term Roach Millsaps was
indicted tbr the larceny of the property described in the warrant, and
that at a subsequent day of the same term a forfeiture was ordered of
the recognisance of Pharris Millsaps, Jr. On appeal from a judgment
oil a demurrer to a scire facias issued on the recognisance: Held,first,
that this court would presume in favor of the acts of the Circuit Court
that Roach Millsaps and Pharris Millsaps, Jr., were one and the same
person ; second, but at any rate, since this was a matter of fact and not
of law, a demurrer would not lie: State v. Millsaps, 69 Mo.
CRI MINAL LAW.
Forgery.-Where, in an indictment for uttering a forged receipt, the
instrument set out not prima facie a receipt, such extrinsic facts must
be averred as are necessary to show that the instrument would, if gen-
uine, have the operation and effect of a receipt: lenry v. The State, 35
Ohio St.
An averment that the instrument set out was a receipt, does not have
the effect to change its prima facie character. Nor will the character
of the instrument be changed by an averment that by the rules of the
bank where the instrument was used, it was upon its face a receipt. It
should be shown in what way the instrument, if genuine, would, under
the rules of the bank, have the operation and effect of a receipt: Id.
Indictment- When Exceptions in a Statute must be ANegatived.--
Where the enacting clause of a statute is complete and the provisos
making exceptions follow as distinct clauses of the statute, it is not ne-
cessary to negative the exceptions in the indictment, but the facts raising
the exception relied on must come from the defence. Where there
is an exception so incorporated with the enacting clause of the statute
that the one cannot be read without the other, there the exception must
be negatived in the indictment: Barber v. The State, 50 Md.
Instructions-Harmless Error.-Defendant being indicted for stealing
a mare, the court correctly instructed the jury, both on the theory that
she was stolen in the county of the trial, and on the theory that she
was stolen in another county and then imported into the county of trial
There was evidence that the theft was committed in the latter county.
Beld, that even if there was no evidence of larcenous taking in the
other county, no error had been committed prejudicial to defendant.
The State v. Ware, 69 Mo.
Intoxication as Evidence of inability to commit the Offence charged-
Accessory-Conviction for second offence of the same kind-Constitu-
tional Law.-In a criminal action it is competent for the accused to
show that at or about the time when the crime was committed he was
in such a physical condition as to render it improbable that he com-
mitted it; and the fact that such condition was caused by intoxication
makes no difference in the rule. the intoxication not being set up as a
defence: Ingalls v. The State, 48 or 49 Wis.
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In a criminal action it is in general within the discretion of the court
below whether to instruct the jury not to find defendant guilty upon
the unsupported testimony of an accomplice; and where that court re-
fuses a new trial after a verdict founded upon such testimony alonei
the judgment will not be reversed upon that ground: Id.
Statutes imposing a greater penalty for a second or third offence of
the same character than that imposed for the first offence, do not violate
the constitutional provision which forbids putting one twice in jeopardy
for the same offence : d.
DAMAGES. See Highway.
Profits lost by other, party's Breach of Contrat-Evidence.-On a
contract by which plaintiff undertook to get out and deliver to defend-
ants a certain quantity of logs, while defendants were to furnish him all
necessary supplies for men and teams, where it appears that, in conse-
quence of defendants' failure to perform on their part, plaintiff was able
to deliver only a part of the logs, plaintiff is entitled to recover not only
the profits which he would have realized from the delivery of the logs
which he was prevented from delivering, and the contract price of those
actually delivered, but also the extra expense in delivering the latter
caused by defendants' fault: Salvo v. Duncan et al, 48 or 49 Wis.
Plaintiff, as a witness in his own behalf, was permitted to state the
actual cost of putting in the logs delivered, and what it would have cost
him had he been well supplied by defendant: Held, no error: id.
Another witness for plaintiff, who had been employed by him in
getting out the logs, and had been engaged in lumbering, "doing
almost all kinds of work" connected therewith, for many years, was
permitted to state his opinion as to whether plaintiff, with the force he
had, could have continued, if well supplied, to put in a certain amount
of logs per day: Held, that the evidence was of the nature of expert
testimony, and admissible: Id.
DEED. See Euity.
Destruction by Parties before Recording.-Where a deed conveying
real estate is executed and delivered, the destruction of the unrecorded
instrument will not revest the title in the grantoi ; and the grantee will
not be estopped to claim the land under such conveyance, unless such
claim would operate as a fraud on his part: Jeffers v. Philo, 35 Ohio
St.
EQUITY. See Execution; Nuisance.
Jurisdiction- Conveyance-" More or less" in a Deed.-Where the
plaintiff commenced an action for a balance upon a promissory note given
fto the purchase of land, and the defendant averred false representations
in the sale of laud, and prayed for the cancellation of the note to the
extent of the damages, and other relief: Held, that the case was cog-
nisable in equity: ilosleton v. Dickinson et al, 51 Iowa.
The presence in a deed of the words "more or less," after the state-
ment of the number of acres therein, does not imply that the purchaser
takes the risk of the quantity; but a slight variation from the amount
stated, with this qualification, will not afford the purchaser ground for
relief: -d
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Mistake-Reforming written Contract.-If parties enter into an
agreement, and through an error in the reduction of it to writing, the
written agreement fails to express their real intentions, or contains terms
.or stipulations contrary to their common intention, a court of equity will
correct and reform the instrument so as to make it conform to the inten-
tion of the parties: Dulany et al., Ex'rs., v. Rogers, 50 Md.
It is incumbent, however, upon the party seeking to reform a written
instrument to show by conclusive proof that it does not embody the
final intention of the parties. A court of equity will not rectify it un-
less it was executed under a common mistake, both parties having done
that which neither of them intended. A mistake on one side may be
ground for rescinding, but not for reforming a written agreement: Id.
When a Court of Equity will rescind an executed Contract of Sale.-
Where a party has been induced to enter into a contract of sale by the
fraudulent misrepresentations of the other party or his agent, of material
facts upon which he relied and had a right to rely, a court of equity
will grant him relief by refusing to decree a specific performance, or by
annulling the contract after it has been carried into execution by the
delivery of deeds to the purchaser; but in such case the onus is on the
complainant to establish the allegations of his bill, by clear and conclu-
sive proof: AeShane v. Hazlehurst, 50 Nd.
A party cannot be relieved from his contract merely because he may
have made a bad.bargain. A contract having been deliberately made
and carried into execution, cannot be rescinded or set aside, at the in-
stance of the party who alleges that he has been deceived and injured,
except upon the clearest and most satisfactory proof: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Corporation; Deed; Taxatioa.
Matter in Pais- When available at Law-.Eectment.-A. and B
were tenants in common. A. sold the whole tract to 0., who thereupon
wrote to B. B. replied by a letter to A., stating that he had intended
to give his share to A., and that C. need not fear anything from him.
C. then conveyed the tract by warranty deeds. In ejectment, brought
nineteen years afterwards, against the purchasers by B.'s grantees,
Held, that the letter was an estoppel in pais to the assertion of B.'s
title: Held further, that this defence was available at law: Dickerson
v. Colgrove, S. C. U. S., Oct Term 1879.
EVIDENCE. See Damages.
EXECUTION.
Public School Property exempt from Execution-IVuntion.-It
would be against the policy of our laws to permit the property of a
board of education, held for public school purposes, to be taken in ex-
ecution at the suit of a creditor: State, to use of Board of Education, v.
Tiedemann, 69 Mo.
Equity will interpose by injunction to prevent a sale of such property
under execution: id.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
Amendment of Claim so as to make new Cause of Aetibon.-In this,
action, originally brought to recover, for an exaction of excessive charges
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for the carriage of goods, the statutory penalty of three times the excess,
it was determined that such an action would not lie, by reason of a re-
peal of the statute: 43 Wis. 688. The prayer of the complaint was
then changed so as to demand only the illegal excess : Held, first, that
this was in effect an amendment of the complaint itself, and that the
question whether the action will lie under such amended complaint is
not res adjudicata. Second, That, as the excessive charges are alleged
to have been made " wrongfully and fraudulently," the action may be
regarded as still one in tort, and the amendment was allowable. Third,
That the cause of action at common law, now stated in the complaint,
was not repealed or suspended by the statute: Sinith v. C. & N. W.
Railway Co., 48 or 49 Wis.
FRAUD. See Equity ; Intoxication.
HIGHwAY. See Negligence.
Defect-Notice to City-Damages for Injury caused by Defect.-It
is for the jury to determine, under all the circumstances of the case,
how long a defect in a sidewalk must have existed in order to charge
the city with constructive notice i and there was no error in refusing to
instruct them that if the defect here shown had existed but one day
prior to the accident, the city was not liable unless it had actual notice:
Sheel v. City of Appleton, 48 or 49 Wis.
Bodily and mental suffering caused by an injury from a defective
highway may be considered in awarding damages: Goodno v. Oshkosh,
28 Wis. 300, and other cases in this court: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Wife's Separate Property- Charging it for prior Debts.-Real estate
inherited by a married woman since the passage of the Act of 1861
(S. & S. 391), which declares such inheritance to be her separate pro-
perty, can not be charged in equity for the payment of a liability
incurred by her prior to the passage of the statute : Fallis v. Keys, 35
Ohio St.
IDENTITY. See Courts.
INSURANCE.
Covenant against other Insurance.-A condition in a fire policy
against subsequent insurance is not broken by the taking of subsequent
policies by the insured which never took effect by reason of conditions
therein contained: Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Holt, 35 Ohio St.
The receipt of payment on such subsequent void policies is not matter
of defence in an action on the prior policy: Id.
Furnishing proofs of Loss as a Condition Precedent-Waiver of con-
dition by general denial of Liability-Knowledge of Agent issuing
Policy.-Where a fire insurance policy provides that the loss shall not
be payable until the expiration of a specified time after the proofs of
loss have been furnished, the furnishing of such proofs is a condition
precedent to the right of action; and, in an action on the policy, an
averment in the answer that such proofs were not furnished for the spe-
cified length of time before the action was brought, does not create an
issue in abatement which must be tried before the other issue, in bar:
VOL. XXVfI.-50
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flarriman et al. v. Queen Ins. Co. of London and Liverpool, 48 or 49
Wis.
In such an action an answer showing that plaintiff furnished what
purported to be proofs of loss, and that these were not accepted as a
compliance with the terms of the policy, but that "defendant at once
denied that any liability to plaintiffs had arisen under said alleged pol-
icy, and refused to pay any alleged claim thereunder": Held, to show a
denial of liability in any event, and an unqualified refusal to pay the
loss; which'was a waiver of such proofs: Id.
Where the agent who issues an insurance policy knows, at the time,
of outstanding encumbrances upon the property, omitted from the state-
ments of the application, such omission will not prevent a recovery:
Id.
INTOXICATION. See Criminal Law.
Contract-Fraud.-To defeat a contract on the ground of drunken-
ness the intoxication must have been so excessive as to deprive the
party of the use of his reason and understanding: Willcox v. Jackson,
51 Iowa.
Where a party procures the intoxication of another for the purpose
of securing an unconscionable advantage in a contract, the contract will
be held void in an action to enforce it: Id.
LUNATIC.
Judgment for Delt contracted when of Sound Mind- What a suffi-
cient service of Summons against him-Appearance of Lunatic by At-
torney -A lunatic can be sued at law for a debt which he contracted
when of sound mind, and judgment therefor obtained against him.
Lunacy is no sufficient ground, in equity, for declaring such a judgment
a nullity: Stigers et al. v. Brent et al., 50 Md.
A summons in an action for debt was issued against a lunatic, and it
appeared that the sheriff's deputy to whom the writ was delivered for
service, called at the house of the defendant named therein and was
informed he was lunatic and could not be seen. The sheriff's deputy
thereupon explained the business in hand to the wife of the lunatic
then in charge of his person, and exhibited to her the summons. She
referred him to her son, by whom the lunatic's estate was managed,
whom the deputy saw and to whom he showed the writ, and afterwards
returned it to the sheriff with an oral statement of what he had done.
The sheriff returned the writ endorsed by him, "summoned." At the
following trial term two attorneys appeared for the defendant. In a
proceeding in equity to set aside the judgment as null and void, it was
held, that under the circumstances, a sufficient service of the summons
was shown. A lunatic defendant of full age properly defends by attor-
ney, the law presuming him of snfficient capacity for that purpose.
The appearance of the defendant in obedience to its command gave the
court jurisdiction over the case; Id.
MANDAMUS. See Receiver.
MORTGAGE.
Of Vessels-Failure to acknowledge or record-.Validity of-Act of
Congress.-Between the parties and as against persons having actual
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notice a mortgage of a vessel is good without the acknowledgment and
recording required by sections 4192 and 4193 Rev. Stat.: Moore v.
,imonds, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Covenant of Warranty.-Where the mortgage, upon a foreclosure of
the mortgage and sale of the mortgaged premises, purchases the pro-
perty fir the amount of the debt, interest and costs, he cannot after
ward maintain an action upon the covenants of warranty contained in
the mortgage, unless the sale and satisfaction of the judgment shall be
set aside: Todd et al. v. Johnson et al., 51 Iowa.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Liability .for Consequential Damages to Private Property- Tahing
of Private Property for Public Use-A .Aunicipal Corporation not re-
sponsible for an unauthorized act of the -Mfayor- Use of Water by Citi-
zens under an Ordinance authorized by Act of Assembly.-The author-
ities of the City of Cumberland, in the execution of the powers con-
ferred on the corporation by Act of Assembly, for the paving, grading,
repairing, draining, sewering and extending of the streets of the city,
but with no want of reasonable care and skill in making the improve-
ments, changed or so directed the natural flow of surface-water, which
usually found its way into a mill-race in the city, that a larger flow of
such water than formerly was emptied into a mill-race, along a given
street, and in times of heavy rains a larger quantity of mud, sand and
debris was thus carried into the race near the mill than before such
improvements were made. For the injuries caused by these obstruc-
tions to the free flow of water, the owner of the mill and its appurten-
ances brought suit against the city to recover damages ; feld, that as
the defendant acted within the scope of the authority conferred on it
by the laws of the state, and with no want of reasonable care and skill
in the execution of the power, the action could not be maintained;
.Mayor of Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md.
The negligent and careless performance of a lawful act, whereby in.
jury results, gives rise to an action against a municipal corporation as
well as against an individual: Id.
Where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of
water, earth, sand or other material, or by having any artificial struc-
ture placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impaii its usefulness, it
is a taking of private property within the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition: Id.
Where the mill-race of the plaintiff was filled by the washings from
the street, by means of hose attached to fire plugs, done under the di-
rection of the mayor of a municipal corporation, in an action for dam-
ages it was held, that as the act on the part of the mayor was unauthor-
ized, the city was not responsible: .
Negligene-Liability for Damage by Wind.-A city is not liable in
damages for injuries inflicted upon a person by the fall of a market
house caused by a wind storm of unprecedented force and violence:
Flori v. City of St. Louis, 69 Mo.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
Bridges over-Erected by State authority.-In the absence of any
restrictive legislation on the subject by Congress, the state may author-
ize bridges over navigable streams, by statutes so guarded as to pro.
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tect the substantial rights of navigation: County Comm'rs of Tat b0t
Co. v. County, Cor'rs of Queen Anne Co., 50 Md.
NEGLIGENCE. See Action; Highway; Municipal Corporation.
Right to remove Snow from its -track by Railway Company- True
test 6f Exemption from Liability for In ury to another's Property.-On
the 6th January 1877 there was a heavy fall of snow, and the Balti-
more City Passenger Railway Company, in clearing its track running
along the bed of Gay street and across Hoffman street, threw the snow
into a mass at the intersection of those streets. Near by on Hoffman
street was the house of the plaintiff. On the night of the day men-
tioned it rained very hard, and the plaintiff's house was flooded with
water. He thereupon brought suit against the railway company, alleg-
ing that in removing the snow from its track and throwing it into the
street it had obstructed the natural flow of water, whereby the plaintiff's
house was injured. This was denied by the defendant. The verdict
and judgment being for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed: Held,
first, that the defendant had a right to remove the snow from its track,
and in clearing its track and in throwing the snow on the bed of the
street adjoining thereto, the defendant did not use the bed of the street
in an unusual or unreasonable manner. Second, that it had no right
to throw the snow in the gutter and thereby obstruct the natural flow
of water from the street, because in so doing it would have been guilty
of negligence; nor had it a right to bank up the snow on Gay street so
as necessarily to obstruct the natural flow of water. On the contrary,
it was obliged to exercise ordinary care and prudence, not only in re-
moving the snow from its track, but also in throwing it on the street:
Short v. Baltimore Myts Passenger Railway Co., 50 Md.
The true test of exemption from liability in actions for injury to
another's property resulting from the exercise of rights incident to the
dominion and ownership of property is, whether in the act complained
of, the owner has used his property in a reasonable, usual and proper
manner, taking care to avoid unnecessary injury to others : ."d.
NUISANCE.
When, a Court.of Equity will interfere-Nuisance from Smoke, Nox-
ious Vapor, Noise or Vibration.-The criterion for determining whether
a court of equity will interfere and restrain by injunction an existing or
threatened nuisance to a party's dwelling is, whether the nuisance com-
plained of will or does produce such a condition of things as in the
judgment of reasonable men is naturally productive of actual physical
discomfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities, and of ordinary tastes
and habits, and as, in view of the circumstances of the case, is unrea-
sonable and in derogation of the rights of the complainant: Dittman v.
Repp, 50 Md.
In determining the question of nuisance from smoke or noxious vapor,
or from noise or vibration, reference must always be had to the locality,
the nature of the trade, the character of the machinery, and the man-
ner of using the property producing the annoyance and injury com
plained of: Id.
Noise alone, if it be of such a character as to be productive of actual
physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibility,
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may create a nuisance, and be the subject of an action at law, or an
injunction from a court of equity, though such noise may result from
the carrying on of a trade or business in a town or city: Id.
If, superadded to the mere noise made by the operation of machinery
in the building of a brewer adjoining the dwelling of the complainant,
the working of the engine or pump produces strong vibratory and jarr-
ing motions which shake the complainant's house and render it unfit
and unsafe for habitation, such state of things clearly amounts to a
nuisance, such as will give a right of action at law, or a court of equity
will restrain: Id.
PARTNERSHEP. See Contract.
M'lange of Nam&--Evidence.-It is competent, in an action against a
partnership, to show that notwithstanding the withdrawal of a partner
and a change of the firm name the partnership has remained practically
the same, and the business was conducted by the same persons both
before and after the withdrawal and change : .Mellinger v. -Parsons, 51
Iowa.
PLEADING.
Action to recover Money paid on Contract that has been rescinded. -.
Where money has been paid on a contract which has been subsequently
rescinded, and the repayment of the money is the only thing remaining
to be done, a petition for money had and received is sufficient; but while
the contract is subsisting, the action can only be brought on the agree-
ment: Middleport Woollen Mills v. Titus, 35 Ohio St.
Variance-Action ex contratu-Proof of Trover and Conversion, or
Fraud and Deceit.-A party cannot sue on a contract of sale and pur-
chase and recover for trover and conversion, or fraud and deceit: Car
son et al. v. Oummings, 69 Mo.
Therefore, where plaintiff sued for the price of cattle, alleging that
they were purchased by defendant C. as agent for his co-defendants M.,
K. & Co., and were received by M., K. & Co. and sold by them, and
the proceeds appropriated to their own use: field, that if it appeared
that M., K. & Co. had never authorized C. to purchase for them, and
that they received the cattle as the property of (., and not as their own
property, they were not liable, notwithstanding it was shown that the
cattle were bought by C. for their account, and at the time they were
delivered to M., K. & Co., C. informed them that he had so bought
them. Whether M., K. & Co. would have been liable to plaintiff in
some other form of action, gusre: Id.
POSSESSION.
Adverse--Principal and Surety.-A. sold a tract of land to B., from
whom it passed by mesne conveyances to the defendant, who took pos-
session. The sale to B. was on credit, B. giving his bond for the pur-
chase-money with plaintiff as surety. Plaintiff being compelled to
pay the bond, took a conveyance of the land from A. and brought
this suit to recover possession. Defendant relied on the Statute of
Limitations : Held, that the possession of B., and of the defendant
under him, was subordinate to the rights of A., and in the absence of
evidence to show that it ever assumed a hostile character, the st;atute
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
never commenced to run. Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to recover,
but upon refunding to the plaintiff the amount of the purchase-money,
defendant could retain the land: Fulkerson v. Brownlee, 69 Mo.
RAILROAD. See Negligence.
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Things Personal by rature may become Realty by their use and po-
sition -What is in its nature otherwise personal property, nevertheless,
when physically attached to the soil, or constructively attached by its
use or intended use with the soil, will pass with the title to the realty:
Jenkins v. MeCurdy, 48 or 49 Wis.
While slabs, sawdust, shavings and other refuse matter used to fill
up low and marshy ground may be a part of the realty, slabs and pieces
of lumber suitable for firewood, piled up on the premises and intended
to be used and removed as such, are personal property : Id.
RECEIVER.
Railroad untler management of--Mandamus to control his Conduct.-
Where the Court of Cumion Pleas, having jurisdiction in an action
against a railroad corporation, has appointed a receiver who is in pos-
session of the road, its property and assets, and is proceeding in the ex-
ecution of the trust under the direction and orders of the court, a man
damnus will not be issued against such corporation and receiver directing
their conduct in operating the road: State ex rel. Commissioners of
W'rshingtou County v. H. & C. Railroad Co., 35 Ohio St.
STATUTE. See United States Statutes.
Construction- Tariff Laws-Meaning of Words- Commercial Term.
-The phrase "goods of similar description," when used in the tariff
laws, is not a commercial term, and it is not error to instruct the jury
that " these words are to be taken and understood in their popular and
received import as generally understood in the community at large:"
Greenleaf v. Goodrich, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Retroactive effect of-Repeal by lmplication.-Before a statute can
be allowed to have a retroactive operation, the court must see that the
words are so clear, strong and imperative in their retrospective expres-
sion that no other meaning can be attached to them, or that the plain
intention of the legislature could not otherwise be gratified : Appeal
Tax Court of Baltimore v. Western Aid. Railroad Co., 50 Md.
Where rights are acquired under a statute in the nature of a contract,
or where there is a grant of power, a repeal of the statute will not di-
vest the right or interest acquired, nor annul acts done under it. ITd.
The general doctrine on the subject of implied repeal is that where
there are two acts on the same subject, both are to be given effect, if
possible. If, however, the two acts are plainly repugnant to each other
in any of their provisions, the later act, without any repealing clause,
will operate to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first;
and even where two acts are not, in express terms, repugnant, yet, if
the later act covers the whole subject of the first act and embraces new
provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the
first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act: Id.
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Where the powers or directions contained in several acts are such as
may well subsist together, a repeal by implication is never declared : Id.
SURETY. See Possession.
Liabffity upon Bond cannot be extended by Implication.-Whcre
there are several distinct and severable undertakings embraced in the
same written agreement, and a bond is executed to secure the faithful
performance of one of such undertakings, the liability of the surety
upon the bond cannot be extended to embrace the other undertakings
not specifically covered by the bond: Noyes v. Granger et al., 51 Iowa.
TAXATION.
Estoppel against disputing Illegal Taxation.-Payment of town
taxes fbr a period of five years by the owners of land not legally liable
to such taxation, submission for a like period to the exercise of juris-
diction by the town authorities in other matters, and participation in an
election at which a subscription to a railroad company was voted by the
town, in payment of which bonds were subsequently issued, are not suf-
ficient by themselves to estop such persons from disputing the legality
of such taxation: Town of Cameron v. Stephenson, 69 Mo.
Taxation qf Public Debts of other States, held by Residents of this
State, and exempted from Taxation by such States-Situs of the Stock,
the Domicile of its holder.-The power of taxation may be exercised by
this state upon stocks, bonds or other certificates of public debt issued
by other sovereign states, or by municipalities created by them, which
are exempted by the states issuing them, and owned by citizens or res-
idents of this state : Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore v. Patterson, 50
Md.
The contract of exemption is limited to the state granting it, as its
authority is only co-extensive with its territory, and cannot operate on
the rights and powers of other states: Id.
The situs of the stock being that of the domicile of its holder, his
property is subject to the sovereign powers of the state wherein he re-
sides. Whether this power should be exercised or not is a legislative,
not a judicial question: Id.
TRESPASS.
May be maintained against former Owner to whom price is still due.
-Plaintiff, being in the exclusive and peaceable possession and control
of property with the acquiescence of defendant (the owner or former
owner of an interest therein), will not be prevented from maintaining
an action for trespass to such property against defendant, by the fact
that plaintiff is liable to him for the value of such interest : Wausau
Boom Co. v. Plumer, 48 or 49 Wis.
TRIAL. See Witness.
UNITED STATES COURTS,
Division of Opinion of Judges in Circuit Court.-When on the
trial or hearing of a cause the judges of the Circuit Court are opposed
iu opinion on a material question of law, the opinion of the presiding
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judge is to prevail and be considered the opinion of the court for the
time being, but the judgment or decree rendered may be reviewed on
writ of error or appeal, without regard to its amount, upon a certificate
of the judges stating the question upon which they differed :Dow v.
Johnson, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Legal and equitable Actions-Joinder in one Suit.-In the Federal
courts the union of equitable and legal causes of action in one suit is
not permissible under the Process Act of 1792, substantially re-enacted
in the Revised Statutes, declaring that in suits in equity, in the Circuit
and District Courts of the United States, the forms and modes of pro-
ceeding shall be according to the principles, rules and usages which
belong to courts of equity. So held in a case transferred to the Fed-
eral court from a court of Texas, in which state the union of equitable
and legal causes of action in one suit is permitted: Burt v. .HDllings-
worth, S. C. U. S, Oct. Term 1879.
UNITED STATES STATUTES.
Efect of the Revision of 1873-Power of Courts to look at former
Acts.-The Revised Statutes of the United States must be treated as a
legislative declaration by Congress of the statute law on the subjects
which they embrace on the first day of December 1873, and when the
meaning is plain the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been
revised to see if Congress erred in that revision : United States v.
Bowen, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
But when it becomes necessary to construe language used in the re-
vision which leaves a substantial doubt of its meaning, the original
statutes may be resorted to for ascertaining that meaning: Id.
WAIVER. See Insurance.
WAREHOUSEMAN. See Balment.
WARRANTY. See Mortgage.
WITNESS.
The Maxim F alsus in uno, &c.-The uncorroborated testimony of
of a witness who wilfully testifies falsely to a fact mateiial to the issue
may be taken by the jury as unworthy of credence : D Oe v. Scott, 35
Ohio St.
Trial-Cross-examination.-In England, if a witness is called to
prove any facts connected with the case, he becomes a witness for all
purposes, and the other side may cross-examine him in regard to all
watters relevant to the issues before the jury. In this country this
right is limited to facts and circumstances connected with matter stated
by the witness in his direct examination ; and if the other side proposes
to examine him respecting other matters, they must do so by making
him their own witness: G-riffith v. D1ifenderter, 50 Md.
